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**A STRATEGY for ARMS CONTROL;
MILITARY-TO-MILITARY CONTACTS**

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April 1994




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A Strategy for Arms Control; Military-to-Military Contacts

Section I INTRODUCTION

Arms control can take on many faces in a diverse world. Limiting nuclear weapons during the Cold War, reducing conventional forces in Europe toward the end of that same war, seeking to help structure and organize our former adversaries' military forces are demands towards a more peaceful world. These challenges are being addressed and are being met with varying degrees of success in terms of arms control.

The efforts of the political negotiators and their military advisors have been significant. The types of control desired varies from reduction to complicated verification to actual elimination. The military strategy behind arms control seeks decreased tensions. It seeks to lower the possibility of aggressive actions while at the same time increasing security.

The purpose of this discussion is to highlight the role of the military in the newest form of arms control; military-to-military exchanges. A brief definition of arms control and strategy are presented, followed by a history of developments on the European continent. The standard operating procedures of the military-to-military units are

discussed. United States and NATO programs are explained and a comparison of methods is presented. The successes, failures, and a look into the future conclude the overall discussion. This final task is "crystal ball" technology at best, but it is important to analyze the military's new role in shaping Europe and providing control for an unstable world.

A Definition of Control

Control is defined as, "1. exercising authority or dominating influence over. 2. verify or regulate. 3. a standard of comparison." Huntington states it more pointedly saying, "In the post-Cold war world the primary objective of arms control is to prevent the development of military capabilities that could threaten western interests." (6:46) These definitions apply to many aspects of current military-to-military exchanges. The United States does not exercise authority over its allies, much less any of the Eastern Block countries, but the mil-to-mil contacts do provide a degree of **influence**, a means of **verification**, and a way to **compare** forces. Certainly, in its fullest sense, the word control means guiding the decisions and development playing an important role in restraining and structuring our adversaries' military forces.

Arms control should serve to increase United States security and decrease the chances of military failure. The military professional must not see, "Arms control agreements (as) a substitute for peace, or a magical device for achieving peace by a stroke of the pen." (10:8) Arms control efforts are not an end in themselves; they must be tied to military strategy.

Strategy Implications

"What is of supreme importance in war is to attack the enemy's strategy; . . . next best is to disrupt his alliances." Sun Tzu (13:77-78) The strategy of military-to-military contacts is attempting both in peacetime by peaceful means. The National Security Strategy of the United States consistently recognized indirect, rather than direct, applications of military power are the most desirable and cost-effective ways to achieve national objectives. (2:57) Military-to-military contacts achieve US goals in a non-confrontational, indirect manner and promote the democratic concepts and principles the US and its military forces cherish.

The State Department defined US objectives for mil-to-mil contacts and set forth goals in an April 92 message.

1. "Promote restraint in military hardware modernization to prevent the outbreak of regional arms races"
2. "Promote democratic concepts of civil-military relations and oversight of security services."

3. "Promote the conversions of military and Military-Industrial assets to civilian uses." (16:2)

Transforming broad national security policy into military strategy requires a clear objective. Defined in military terms, **objective** is "direct military operations toward a defined and attainable objective." (1:1) The US has defined its strategy, policy, and objectives in its pursuits in the Central and Eastern European (CEE) countries and the military has a well defined role in attaining these goals. The Joint Staff promulgated the State Department message to the military community in May 92, directing the Joint Contact Teams (JCTs) of US European Command (USEUCOM), "to work with the military forces of selected countries to help them develop into positive, constructive elements of their democratic societies that are apolitical and non-threatening and that respect human rights and adhere to the rules of law." (15:1) The mil-to-mil contacts should assist CEE military leader's transition to accepting civilian oversight, democratic values, and defensive military structures. These are important goals for each country to achieve, sooner vice later, before they start searching for other alliances. (5:130,144)

To achieve these goals, US military strategy must be put into action. Air Force Manual 1-1 reinforces the military's role in accomplishing this strategy with two statements.

"American military forces are called upon to train and advise other nations in matters of defense, to include foreign internal defense. Training and advisory efforts promote regional stability, self-defense capabilities, and internal order among foreign friends and allies." (1:3)

"These contacts often prove helpful in pursuing such national goals as democratization and peaceful conflict resolution." (1:3)

Although these general guidelines take many forms, their success in current mil-to-mil operations can only be measured in time as the contacted country's respond. The CEE countries' response is influenced by the events leading to the current situation in Europe.

History

The concept of today's military-to-military exchanges has a relatively short history. Admiral Crowe (then CJCS) met with Marshal Akhromeyev (his Soviet counterpart) for a week in July 1988 and discussed military-to-military exchanges. They proposed "a formal program of military-to-military contacts between our services" and designed exchanges to "cut down on the possibility of friction between our two forces." (4:274) The arms control goal of reducing tensions is manifest in these exchanges. However, even after a week in the US, Akhromeyev declared to Crowe privately that he still thought "the prospects for your country attacking mine are very high." (4:284)

This attack, of course, never occurred and is probably less likely now than at any time in the last 50 years. Since Akhromeyev's visit, many significant events have taken place in Europe making a superpower confrontation improbable, but European security no more stable. The US was, and remains, prepared for war, but events have led to military participation in other forms of exchanges to help promote security in the region.

After the reunification of Germany and the breakup of the Warsaw Pact, the flood gates to and from the East were opened. Two major reasons for this rapid move to share with the East can be cited. First, the CEE countries felt a vacuum of security as the Former Soviet Union (FSU) pulled its troops out of these former Warsaw Pact countries. Second, the West wanted to ensure the irreversibility of this transformation of the CEE countries.

Evidence is ample regarding the lack of security in the East. Striving for alliance protection "Hungary became the first former Warsaw Pact country to formally accept associate membership in the North Atlantic Assembly" in Jan 91. (9:34) This was followed quickly by the total breakup of the Warsaw Pact, agreed to by Gorbachev in February and completed by July 1991. (9:36) The CEE countries applied for, requested, and otherwise pleaded for assistance from the western alliance many times and in many ways since the

initial request by Hungary. These overtures from the East were initially met with cool restraint from the West, but in time NATO and its member states began to respond.

NATO started its outreach with a 23 point peace package offered to the former Warsaw Pact countries. This package, discussed at the London summit in July 1990, culminated over a year later, in Nov 1991, in the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC). The NACC was designed to include political leaders of the former Warsaw Pact, the Soviet Republics, and the newly independent Baltic states. The NACC now has 38 member states (16 NATO and 22 CEE/FSU) whose foreign ministers, defense ministers, and military chiefs of staff can "confer on a regular basis." (9:38) The goal of NATO is to help the "emerging states of the former Soviet bloc participate in a new security framework where they are real partners; not seen as defeated states or mere recipients of international aid. (7:56) NATO's efforts should "build cooperative relationships by means of such initiatives as NACC, as new governments and new militaries are forming, and new democratic values and open markets are being tested." (7:56) NATO's peace package and the new security framework are best delivered by means of the various military-to-military contact programs.

Section II

MIL-TO-MIL CONTACTS

"Building peace within and among nations is the work of many individuals and institutions; it is the fruit of ideas and decisions taken in the political, cultural, economic, social, military, and legal sectors of life." (8:8) This statement of the American Catholic bishops is an encouragement for and a challenge to the endeavors and events of the recent past. The military has been reluctant to see peacemaking or peacekeeping as a role of military professionals trained in the art of war. The roles the western militaries have assimilated are complicated and diverse, but the efforts to change and the willingness to help others change will help establish a framework for peace and security in Europe.

There are as many aspects of mil-to-mil contacts as there are combinations of countries involved in the process. NATO, and its member nations are seeking contacts with members of the former Warsaw Pact as well as former Soviet Republics. The 16 NATO countries and the 22 former Warsaw Pact countries and Soviet Republics represent a wide range of cultural and ethnic backgrounds--and over 350 combinations of these diversities. The US and NATO experiences and programs are used as an example of the diversity, similarity, and range of contacts. This scope of comparison illustrates the interaction between western

alliance members as well as how the US effort is structured within that alliance.

US Experience

The US military has been involved in mil-to-mil contacts of some type at the highest levels for at least six years. It has caught on and filtered down through all levels. From the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs to the most junior airman on the expert teams, the efforts are making an impression.

The US experience is illustrated with two examples demonstrating the difference in the Unified Command's emphasis as opposed to the Service Component. Representative activities of USEUCOM's JCT (i.e., general team building) and its Air Force component (much more specialized) are presented.

HQ USEUCOM. The Unified Command sets policy for the theater, interpreting and implementing the guidance of the civilian leadership and the Joint Staff. The United States European Command defined its tasks to:

"Promote the development of apolitical Armed Forces loyal to civilian oversight, restructure forces for legitimate defensive needs, depoliticize military organizations and remove use of military force from the political process, instill respect for human rights and the rule of law, enhance public respect for the military within society, expand cooperation and contact between the armed forces of the region and those of the US, develop cadre of military leaders well-versed in democratic norms. . ." (14:1)

This rather extensive list of tasks is accomplished best through direct contact and technical exchanges since many of these concepts are difficult to simply teach. The structure and organization set up at USEUCOM headquarters promotes these goals through a wide variety of exchanges.

The first exchange with a particular country is normally of the highest level, assuring the host nation (HN) of US resolve. This is either accompanied by or followed closely with a staff officer level exchange to gather information on specific needs and desired assistance. Specifics are tasked down to the component with the actual expertise or accomplished by the USEUCOM staff if available expertise exists. Appendix A presents an example of contacts made with Hungary, US's first host nation (HN) country, illustrating this sequence of events.

Expert teams or traveling contact teams (TCTs) may visit several HN countries. These teams are most often provided by one of the components. In the HN country the TCTs interface with the Military Liaison Team (MLT).

The USEUCOM Joint Contact Team has a desk officer for each country of interest and has established Military Liaison Teams (MLTs) in 11 countries. The MLTs serve many masters. They work with the Embassy in the country they reside, but do not live or work there. They work with the country's Ministry of Defense (MOD), but do not normally have an

office there either. Finally, they work directly with the JCT and sponsor the traveling expert teams visiting their particular country. In this framework, the most important aspect of the contacts is probably the example set by the team members from the various components.

HQ USAFE. As a component, United States Air Force in Europe (USAFE), plays a vital role. It has much expertise to offer, as do the other services, who put together briefings, seminars, and demonstrations on any topic of interest. The components receive tasking from the Unified command and pass them on to specific units. The unit's TCTs visit any HN requesting their specific assistance or expertise. The military bearing and professionalism of these teams provide the HN with as much information about a civilian controlled military in a democratic society as the briefings and demonstrations. It is a compliment to all US military personnel that their professionalism and expertise have made such an impact throughout the CEE.

USAFE has been actively engaged in mil-to-mil contacts for two years. They provide USEUCOM with TCTs, Unit Exchanges (UNITEX), and Familiarization Tours (FAM TOUR). Among the TCTs provided by USAFE are; Air Defense and Air Traffic Control, Air Base Engineering, Legal System, Military Medicine, Computers and Simulation, Fire Fighting, Maintenance/Safety, Public Affairs, and Force Structure

Planning. Appendix B includes a more complete list of the USAFE expert teams or TCTs and number of countries each has contacted. These TCTs visit a HN on request and a HN may request a similar team from another country as well--enter NATO.

NATO Experience

NATO's efforts are focused on both political and military aspects in attempting to enhance the security of member nations. NATO, however, must call on its member nations to supply personnel, finances, and equipment to accomplish any task. The mil-to-mil contact process is no exception. The headquarters staff tasks the regional staffs, who in turn request the governments of their region to assist in contacting the military staffs of the former Warsaw Pact and FSU Republics in their region.

SHAPE has tasked approximately 200 events scheduled for 1994. At SHAPE an event is defined as one contact with one country. Many of these events are actual contacts made by NATO staff officers. These contacts, like USEUCOM, are information gathering missions followed by expert teams from various countries on the specific areas of interest to the HN visited.

As an example, Allied Forces Southern Region (AFSOUTH) headquarters works with 14 countries. Each country is treated individually, as each has different needs and wants.

Some CEE countries accept assistance from certain western alliance members (those who share their ethnic and/or religious makeup) better than from others. AFSOUTH has the flexibility to ask the "best" country to interface, enhancing their expert team's effectiveness in dealing with each HN. They have done well in many areas and countries. Appendix D illustrates AFSOUTH's contacts made with Bulgaria. Note this list, as with the others, is an example of the level, types and scope of meetings and contacts, it is not meant to be all inclusive. The lists also provide an excellent comparison--explained briefly in the next section.

Section III

COMPARE AND CONTRAST

The US objective of building stable militaries and governments capable of maintaining a democratic society is similar to other NATO nations. NATO's goal is also similar, but with a broader focus; its effort promotes the security of all member nations and also the security of "new" NACC member states.

US efforts vice our Allies

The efforts of the US may have a different focus and depth than our allies, but a nation's actual objectives are internal in nature. As the largest nation within NATO, the US can provide many resources in the form of military training and example, albeit a lack of hardware and dollars. Our efforts, to our credit, like that of our allies, have focused mainly on technical expertise, not military hardware. Our objectives have been clearly stated from the beginning, they are achievable and have been flexible enough to change with the changing situation. By analyzing the efforts and contacts of our allies, their goals appear similar to that of NATO itself.

NATO vice its member countries

NATO can only accomplish what its member nations are willing to contribute to its cause and its plans. Its greatest struggle is coordinating the requests of the HNs

and finding a member nation to meet the HN need. There is an ever increasing number of NATO members who have active mil-to-mil programs and thus a larger pool of resources available. This in turn leads to more contact, better exchanges, and an acceleration of the gains achieved.

Section IV GAINS THUS FAR

"Despite slow progress, past failure, and frustrations, we must keep trying. . .remaining patient and realistic in our expectations and resolved to maintain the balance of power."

(11:20)

There are four areas indicative of the gains these programs have already achieved. These areas are **human rights** within the military, to include adoption of a form of the US UCMJ and chaplaincy, **training** for both military and civilians in reorganizing the military under civilian control, **public affairs** offices within the military, and establishment of a professional **NCO corps**. A number of the CEE countries have adopted each of these programs and certainly more will follow as the US, NATO, and other member state's outreach expands and matures.

In the area of human rights, four countries have adopted a military legal code based on the US military UCMJ. Other countries are combining military codes of various NATO members for use in their own. This does not ensure the rights of the soldiers, but should make the handling of various offenses uniform and equitable. Five countries have also adopted some form of chaplaincy program in an attempt to meet the needs of the soldiers. This indicates a tolerance for things ethnic and religious, if not support.

Human rights achievements are significant and are a major step toward achieving one of the US goals for the JCTP.

The military reorganization of the former Warsaw Pact countries will take a long time to culminate, however, at least five countries have received assistance in this area already. Hungary, Albania, Poland, Lithuania, and Romania have received extensive training on placing the military under the control of elected officials. The training included military and civilian authorities within the HN. This training can not take effect over night as there are few elected officials who are ready to accept this role.

The reorganization of the military has affected the propaganda offices of the old regime by replacing them with **public affairs** offices. In six countries these offices have turned into true media interface organizations, thus opening the military to scrutiny and making the military accountable to the government and the people. These offices promote the military image within these emerging democracies. This step is necessary for the military of an open and democratic society.

The establishment of an NCO corps is the another major area where gains have been realized. Again it is a long term goal on the part of the US as well as its NATO allies, but at least 5 countries are trying to determine which model is right for their country and military--11 visited the

USAFE NCO Academy or received briefings about it. Having professional soldiers in all ranks is a positive trend for an emerging democratic nation and its military. (12:2)

These areas provide a solid foundation for the militaries of the CEE. They also provide an excellent platform for establishing more robust military exchanges in the future. When two nations' military structures are similar, joint and combined exercises are an easy next step. It is significant to note that Hungary, the first country the US approached, has adopted all of the above programs into their military. The Partnership for Peace process will flourish with the foundation already established in many of the CEE and FSU countries.

Section V

WHAT HAPPENS NEXT

"We should proceed with purpose, even though we will have to proceed with caution." (7:58) There may be some uncertainty about what will actually happen next; however, the CEE and FSU are changed forever. These countries have abandoned communism and are moving toward partnership and peaceful coexistence. The ball may not be squarely in the US court or even that of our western European allies, but NATO and its member nations' next step will effect the outcome of the game.

Partnership for Peace

The Partnership for Peace plan is part of what happens next. It will require the offices created to carry out the programs of the JCTs to grow in both size and scope. This effort envisions joint exercises and military training operations with the Cooperative Partners, the members of the NACC. As these words are being written Russian Partnership is being announced. The number of countries and personnel involved in these events could and should be quite extensive. These exercises and operations will be as diverse as the number of countries involved. It will open doors for the HNs and help the western players conclude what the future role of these emerging countries will involve.

Section VI

CONCLUSION

"Strong alliances are fundamental to US national defense strategy." (3:8) The military has taken the initiative in contacting new allies, but the constitutional mandate of civilian control requires some caution. Actual alliances are established in political, state department channels. However, caution aside, our nation's, our allies', and NATO's efforts are already paying dividends. The strategy of mil-to-mil contacts is one of control and initiative. The HNs are very willing to accept guidance from the west as well as our dimly veiled attempt to control.

The arms control strategy involved in mil-to-mil contacts attempts not only to control, but to help verify and compare forces. It is a confidence building measure, greatly influenced by historical events, both recent and past. NATO and its member states are working hard, at new and sometimes complicated tasks, to ensure the strength of the alliance as they discourage competitive alliances of any sort. The NACC has provided an excellent forum for multi-national, political and military exchanges.

The information shared in these exchanges must be sound in order for the militaries and governments of these emerging nations to have a solid foundation to build their hope for democracy and freedom. The efforts of NATO and all its member nations have been commendable and have sought to

increase security for the alliance members as well as the Central and Eastern European countries and former Soviet Republics. Our strategy seeks control, but must also build strong military structures within democratic societies providing long term security in a more stable Europe.

Appendix A
GLOSSARY OF TERMS

AFSOUTH	Allied Forces Southern Region
BWG	Bilateral Working Group
CEE	Central and Eastern European Countries
CHOD	Chief of Defense
CJCS	Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff
CTPO	Contact Team Program Office
DOS	Department of State
FAM TOUR	Familiarization Tour to USEUCOM Unit or CONUS
FSU	Former Soviet Union
HHDF	Hungarian Home Defense Force
HN	Host Nation or a CEE Cooperation Partner
IWG	Interagency Working Group
JCTP	Joint Contact Team Program
MLT	Military Liaison Team
MODS	Ministries of Defense
NACC	North Atlantic Cooperation Council
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NCO	Non Commissioned Officer
SHAPE	Supreme Allied Powers Europe
TCT	Traveling/Technical Contact Team
UCMJ	Uniform Code of Military Justice
UNITEX	Unit Exchange
USAFE	United States Air Forces in Europe

Appendix B

USEUCOM EXPERIENCE

This is an example of USEUCOM's contacts with Hungary since 1992. This is not all inclusive, but gives a good example of the level, scope, and types of events and the order in which they are accomplished. Typically it progresses from high level and general overviews to lower level and more specific exchanges.

Jul 92	Chairman, JCS visit to Hungary
Jul 92	Commander Special Operations Forces Europe visits Hungary
Sep 92	Hungarian Home Defense Force (HHDF) visits 7 ATC in Germany
Sep 92	European Command Surgeon visits Hungary
Sep 92	Hungarian Gen Priol visits USEUCOM
Oct 92	HHDF officers visit Ramstein and Spangdahlem
Oct/Nov	Several Technical Contact Teams (TCT) visit Hungary; examples are personnel management, logistics and resource management, education and science, and acquisitions
Dec 92	Congressional Liaison visit to Hungary
Jan 93	Resource Management Team follow-up #1
Feb 93	Chief of Chaplains Conference in Budapest
Feb 93	USCINCEUR visit to Hungary
Mar 93	Familiarization Tour (Fam-Tour) to CONUS bases and spaces, both military and civilian
Apr 93	Resource Management Team follow-up #2
Apr 93	Maintenance Unit exchange at Spangdahlem
May 93	Air Defense Fam-Tour to Fort Bliss Texas
May 93	Hungarian Gen Biro to HQ USAREUR

May 93	Armor Unit exchange in Germany
Jun 93	Gen Priol to Communications Conference in US
Jun 93	Mech Inf Unit exchange in Hungary
Aug 93	USEUCOM Surgeon US Medical Tour
Sep 93	Nuremberg Hospital Fam-Tour
Sep 93	Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) Orientation in Hungary
Sep 93	State department Military Liaison Team indoctrination in Hungary
Sep 93	Bilateral Working Group meeting in Hungary
Oct 93	USAFE Band and Tops in Blue visit Hungary
Nov 93	USMC Training and Education Fam-Tour to US
Nov 93	Family Support TCT to Hungary
Dec 93	Flight, Weapons, and Ground Safety TCT to Hungary
Jan 94	Chaplain TCT to Hungary
Jan 94	Army Training and education TCT to Hungary
Feb 94	AFFES Supply Fam-Tour to Germany
Feb 94	Air Space/Air traffic Control/Air Defense Fam-Tour

The above events range from very high level meetings and decision making engagements to very low level exchanges and mundane events of seemingly little importance. Yet each event is an opportunity to show how the West does business and the nature of a military under civilian control.

Note: Events taken from JCT's inclusive data base of Hungarian contacts.

Appendix C

USAFE EXPERIENCE

Example of USAFE Mil-to-Mil Contact effort in 1993/94. This is not all inclusive, but gives a good example of the kinds of teams available and number of countries contacted.

Traveling Contact Team	Number of Countries Visited
Aircraft Maintenance/Safety	5
Air Defense/Air Traffic Control	9
Civil Engineering	8
Computers and Simulation	2
Fire Fighting/Aircrew Extraction	3
Force Structure Planning	1
Legal System/Military Justice	2
Library Management	1
Military Medicine	3
Military Police/Physical Security	6
NCO Academy Visits	11
Personnel Management	2
Public Affairs	5
Resource Management	6

Note: Events taken from USAFE's inclusive data base of TCT contacts.

Appendix D

NATO EXPERIENCE

Example of NATO/AFSOUTH contact effort with Bulgaria in 1993. This may not be all inclusive, but gives a good example of the level, scope, and types of events and the order in which they are accomplished.

Feb 93	Hosted Plans and Policy Conference; 8 Cooperative Partner Countries attended. Included Bulgaria.
Mar 93	Staff visited the Ukraine, Albania, and Bulgaria
May 93	Dep CINCSOUTH visits Albania
May 93	CHOD Bulgaria visit to AFSOUTH
May 93	Bulgarian Staff visit to AFSOUTH
May 93	AIRSOUTH visit to Bulgaria
Jul 93	Bulgarian Naval vessels port call at Naples
Sep 93	Expert team goes to Bulgaria
Nov 93	Ambassadors Day at AFSOUTH; 17 countries attended, NATO and Cooperative Partner, included Bulgaria.
Nov 93	Exercise Planning Staff Officers to Bulgaria

Note: Events received from AFSOUTH's mil-to-mil office via phone call.

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